Nationalist historiography portrays interwar protest in South Asia as predominantly Gandhian, non militaristic, and non-violent. This portrayal is at odds with the experience of other parts of the world, which were shaped by a “violent peace” in the form of small wars, armed insurgencies, the mobilization of paramilitaries, and the increased prominence of the army in the public sphere in a context of the mass demobilization of military personnel. This article asks how South Asia’s interwar labour movement was shaped by a world marked by the experience of World War I and its aftermath. Through a study of labour “volunteer movements” or paramilitaries and military-related claims-making by labour leaders on the colonial state, it argues that “militarization” was an important aspect of labour politics in interwar South Asia. Volunteer movements were a widespread form of mobilization deployed by labouring populations. Labouring communities with historical connections to military service made claims on the colonial state’s patronage during industrial conflict by appealing to their past military service or official status as “martial races”. While this article studies these phenomena among Bombay’s textile and Dalit workers, it references analogous processes that occurred elsewhere on the subcontinent. Using a unique source base of the speeches and writings of labour leaders, publications of volunteer movements, workers’ court depositions, Marathi-language memoirs, strike enquiry committees, and newspaper material, it unearths a world of militaristic ideas and action seldom explored in the context of interwar South Asian labour.
Year: 2025
India’s premature deindustrialization and falling investment rate in the 2010s
India’s GDP growth rate faltered in the 2010s after steadily accelerating for decades since the early 1980s. The slowdown adversely affected employment growth, poverty reduction, and nutritional status. Why did it happen? As the study demonstrates, the answer is India’s premature deindustrialization and rising import dependence on China. Capital and intermediate goods industries got hollowed out, with the manufacturing GDP share stagnating at around 15-17 percent since 1991; annual industrial growth rates have declined steeply since 2015-16, even ignoring the Pandemic years. Manufacturing employment share has declined; agriculture’s share rose in the 2010s—an unmistakable sign of premature deindustrialization.
Why did industrial capacity get depleted relative to increasing consumption? The answer is an unprecedented decline in fixed investment and savings as shares of GDP. The share of fixed investment in industry and manufacturing declined significantly. The rising fixed investment share of services is driven by telecom, Government, and other services. Relatedly, net FDI inflow and domestic capital market mobilization, as proportions of GDP, have declined in the 2010s. Up to 70 percent of FDI went into brownfield investment, not greenfield investment. Policy efforts, namely, the Make in India and Atmanirbhar (self-reliant) Bharat initiative and production-linked incentives (PLI), have yet to yield measurable results.
India now needs an industrial policy to overcome premature deindustrialization, in the changed geopolitical context. It would help reverse the decline in industrial investments and target greenfield FDI and technology acquisition. The public sector must reimagine its entrepreneurial role in long-term strategic interests, as the private corporate investment rate is yet to pick up. Raising public investment while maintaining fiscal and external balances will require raising domestic saving rates. Term-lending institutions must boost the supply of long-term credit at low and stable interest rates. The stagnant domestic R&D investment rate must rise quickly to catch up with China.
Kerala’s Economic Rise: Does It Vindicate Neo-liberalism?
This article is a book review of the “Kerala, 1956 to the Present: India’s Miracle State” by Tirthankar Roy and K Ravi Raman, a Cambridge University Press output. As per R. Nagaraj, the book is concise and well-written as it challenges the prevailing orthodoxy—perhaps a much-needed shake-up of many academic and development experts’ complacency—to extoll the virtues of neo-liberalism for Kerala’s prosperity. Is the argument persuasive? Could it dent the received wisdom? The reviewer is sceptical. With scant evidentiary support, the hypothesis seems to skate on thin ice. To carry the day, the authors need to validate their hypothesis with credible evidence.
Why has net FDI inflow plummeted?
Decline in FDI relative to GDP is a matter of concern and points toward a declining interest among foreign investors
Reversing India’s Industrial Decline Need for Redesigning Policies
In the 2010s, India’s industrial output growth and fixed investment rates have declined, compared to the previous decade, with clear signs of premature deindustrialisation. Policy efforts have failed to stave off the hollowing out of manufacturing, with an unabated rise in India’s import dependence. There is a need to reconfigure industrial policy beyond tariffs and subsidies to acquire a dynamic comparative advantage in strategic industries and retake labour-intensive sectors for employment generation. The strategy needs to have four pillars: boost fixed investments pragmatically to augment domestic capabilities and encourage modernisation; align trade and industrial policies to promote and incentivise domestic value addition; offer location-specific infrastructure and technical support for small firms; and boost R&D investments to support indigenous production—all of which call for development banks to supply long-term credit at low and stable interest rates.